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Notes
Caught in the Web:
Enjoining Defamatory Speech
that Appears on the Internet
JOSEPH G. MARANO*
Courts have consistently interpreted section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
(“CDA”) as shielding internet service providers from liability for defamatory content
posted by users. This is a significant departure from traditional defamation law
where publishers may be held liable for defamation upon reprinting defamatory
material originally written or spoken by third parties. As this Note explains, the
courts’ interpretations of section 230 are in direct conflict with the Act’s legislative
history. Indeed, Congress made clear that the goal of section 230 was to protect
websites that engaged in editorial self-regulation by deleting obscene and
inappropriate content posted by users.
Because of this immunity, plaintiffs who are defamed on the internet have little
recourse, largely due to the practical limitations inherent in litigating online
defamation claims. The California Court of Appeal has attempted to fashion a remedy
for this situation. In Hassell v. Bird, a case pending before the California Supreme
Court, the California Court of Appeal issued an injunction ordering Yelp to remove a
defamatory review. This Note supports the Court of Appeal’s decision, and argues that
the evolving nature of the internet, along with the overbroad immunity courts have
read into section 230 of the CDA, necessitate a remedy. This Note suggests that to
protect First Amendment rights, and to overcome the traditional presumption against
injunctions in defamation cases, courts should design third-party injunctions to
require websites to remove only language that a court has found to be defamatory,
and to also afford websites the opportunity to try the case on the merits in the event
of a default judgment.

* J.D., magna cum laude, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2018; B.A. 2012,
Columbia University. I would like to thank Professor John Diamond for his invaluable guidance and
feedback, as well as my family and friends for their support throughout law school.
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INTRODUCTION
A consistent problem over the last twenty years relates to
defamatory statements that appear on review websites and other internet
service providers such as Yelp.1 Until recently, recourse for internet
defamation victims was virtually non-existent due to section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“section 230” and “CDA,”
respectively).2 Congress promulgated the CDA as a response to what was
known to some legislators as the Great Internet Sex Panic of 1995.3 The
burgeoning internet was¾and still is¾home to a lot of pornography. The
law’s purpose was primarily related to censorship and protecting
children from encountering pornography online.4
Although the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
majority of the censorship provisions of the CDA in Reno v. ACLU, the
Court left section 230 intact.5 Section 230 is largely concerned with
defamation, stating that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information

1. Associated Press, Yelp Is Not Liable for Bad ‘Star’ Ratings of Businesses, Court Rules, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2016, 4:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-yelp-ruling20160912-snap-story.html.
2. See Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1265 (9th Cir. 2016).
3. The Communication Decency Act (CDA) of 1996, OFFENDER WATCH INITIATIVE,
http://offenderwatchinitiative.org/Resources/CDA-Act (last visited Apr. 21, 2018).
4. Id.
5. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
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provided by another information content provider.”6 Thus, unlike
publishers of traditional media such as books and newspapers, civil
liability for defamatory content created by third parties may not be
imposed on internet service providers such as Yelp.7 Case law over the
past twenty years has reflected this trend, and continues to this day.8
Unsurprisingly, section 230 has hardly been able to keep pace with the
multitude of breakthroughs that the technology sector innovates for the
internet on a daily basis.9 As a result, courts are presented with a very
important issue: how to protect and provide recourse for individuals and
businesses defamed online, while still allowing the internet to function
as a media platform where First Amendment rights are of paramount
importance.
Most recently, California courts have encountered this issue in
Hassell v. Bird.10 In Hassell, a disgruntled client (“Bird”) allegedly
defamed her lawyer (“Hassell”) by posting several unfavorable Yelp
reviews under the pseudonym “Birdzeye B.”11 Only one of the reviews
remains on Yelp.12

6. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2011).
7. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th
Cir. 2008).
8. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997); Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc.,
836 F.3d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 2016).
9. See generally Ali Grace Zieglowsky, Note, Immoral Immunity: Using a Totality of the
Circumstances Approach to Narrow the Scope of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act,
61 HASTINGS L.J. 1307 (2010) (arguing that courts should adopt a “totality of circumstances” standard
of review and abandon section 230 immunity); Patricia Spiccia, The Best Things in Life Are Not Free:
Why Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Should Be Earned and Not
Freely Given, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 369 (2013).
10. Hassell v. Bird, 247 Cal. App. 4th 1336 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
11. Id. at 1343.
12. The review reads,
well, here is another business that doesn’t even deserve one star. basically, dawn hassell
made a bad situation much worse for me. she told me she could help with my personal injury
case from falling through a floor, then reneged on the case because her mom had a broken
leg, or something like that, and that the insurance company was too much for her to handle.
and all of this after i met with her office (not her personally, she was nowhere to be found)
signed paperwork to ‘hire’ them and gained confidence in her office (due mostly to yelp
reviews) so, in all fairness, i have to share my experience so others can be forewarned. she
will probably not do anything for you, except make your situation worse. in fact, after
signing all the paperwork with her office, like a broken record, they repeated ‘DO NOT TALK
TO THE INSURANCE COMPANY’ over and over and over. and over and over. so i honored
that and did not speak to them. but, the hassell law group didnt ever speak with the
insurance company either, neglecting their said responsibilities and not living up to their
own legal contract! nor did they bother to communicate with me, the client or the insurance
company AT ALL. then, she dropped the case because of her mother and seeming lack of
work ethic. (a good attorney wont do this, in fact, they arent supposed to) to save your case,
STEER CLEAR OF THIS LAW FIRM! and research around to find a law firm with a proven
track record of success, a good work ethic, competence and long term client satisfaction.
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Hassell filed her complaint in the San Francisco County Superior
Court, and Bird, for whatever reason, never answered.13 As a result,
Hassell obtained a default judgment in which the court imposed liability
on Bird and enjoined Yelp, requiring the website to remove the reviews
and disallow “Birdzeye B.” from posting additional reviews for Hassell’s
law firm.14 Yelp appealed the decision on the basis that the CDA bars the
court from issuing an injunction against a non-party.15 Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeal largely upheld the trial court’s decision, invalidating only
the portion of the injunction relating to Bird’s potential future reviews.16
Consistent with section 230, the California Court of Appeal did not
impose any liability on Yelp.17 Instead, the court attempted to solve the
recurring problem of online defamation by fashioning a remedy that
imposed liability only on the defaming party, while merely enjoining
Yelp, a non-party to the lawsuit.18 The injunction requires Yelp to remove
the defamatory review.19 Despite Yelp’s challenge to the contrary, the
injunction is not actually an imposition of liability.20
This remedy, though certainly an innovative solution, raises a host
of legal questions. These include two interrelated issues: whether the law
permits a court to issue an injunction against a non-party, and, if so,
whether the remedy violates the First Amendment in the context of
internet speech. As of December 2017, Hassell is on appeal before the
California Supreme Court.21 This Note argues that the California Court of
Appeal has fashioned a reasonably effective remedy for online
defamation, but that the California Supreme Court should modify and
narrow the remedy in order to better ensure protection of the First
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of expression.
I. THE CDA, SECTION 230 CASE LAW, AND NON-PARTY INJUNCTIONS
An examination of section 230 and the CDA’s legislative history and
subsequent case law is necessary to properly contextualize the Court of
Appeal’s decision in Hassell and analyze the injunction remedy.
there are many in the bay area and with some diligent smart interviewing, you can find a
competent attorney, but this wont be one of them.
Birdzeye B., Yelp Review, YELP (Jan.
hassell-law-group-san-francisco-2?start=20.
13. Hassell, 247 Cal. App. 4th at 1343.
14. Id. at 1341.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1363.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Hassell v. Bird, 381 P.3d 231 (Cal. 2016).

28,

2013),

https://www.yelp.com/biz/
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A. SECTION 230 OF THE CDA
In 1996, Congress promulgated section 230 of the CDA to permit
and encourage freedom of expression on the internet.22 Congress also
intended to protect websites and internet service providers, which
include websites that allow users to post reviews, online forums and
message boards, social media services, and other online channels of
communication, from liability for third-party content produced by users
of such websites.23
Prior to the enactment of section 230, while Congress was drafting
and debating the law, the Supreme Court of New York decided
Stratton-Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Company.24 Indeed, section
230 was, in part, a response to Stratton-Oakmont and served to overturn
the court’s decision in that case.25 In Stratton-Oakmont, the key issue
before the court was whether Prodigy, an online forum with subscribers
who posted content and messages to the forum, should be considered a
publisher for purposes of defamation law.26 In Stratton, an individual
posted certain defamatory statements on the forum, alleging that
Stratton-Oakmont and the company’s president committed criminal
fraud in connection with a number of securities offerings.27 The court
held that because Prodigy had policies in place regarding permissible
user content, and also because Prodigy routinely edited and moderated
offensive content that users posted, Prodigy should be considered a
publisher similar to a newspaper.28 Importantly, the court emphasized
that it was Prodigy’s policies and editorial actions relating to third-party
content that were the key considerations in holding that Prodigy was a
publisher, rather than the online equivalent to something more like a
library or bookstore.29 The court also expressed the public policy concern
that by editing users’ posts, Prodigy was restricting freedom of speech
and expression on the internet.30
While Congress certainly shared those First Amendment concerns,
it disagreed with the court’s decision in Stratton-Oakmont.31 As a result,
Congress passed the CDA the following year, with section 230 effectively
22. David Lukmire, Can the Courts Tame the Communications Decency Act?: The
Reverberations of Zeran v. America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371, 378–79 (2010).
23. Id. at 379.
24. Stratton-Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
25. H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996). “One of the specific purposes of [section 230] is to
overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy . . . .”
26. Stratton-Oakmont, Inc., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *2.
27. Id.
28. Id. at *3–4.
29. Id. at *12–13.
30. Id. at *12.
31. H.R. Rep. No. 104–458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
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overturning Stratton-Oakmont.32 Congress intended for section 230 to
provide a safe harbor for websites that were “Good Samaritans”¾those
that took reasonable steps to screen content posted by third parties and
remove content that was considered indecent or offensive.33 The idea was
that by providing this safe harbor, Congress would encourage websites to
self-regulate.34 Specifically, subsection (c) of section 230 states that “[n]o
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.”35 Subsection (c) also provides that websites will not be
held liable for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access
to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally
protected.”36
Rather than reading section 230(c) as a narrow safe harbor
affording immunity to websites that self-regulate, courts have instead
read the law as one that provides blanket, absolute immunity to all
websites for any and all content produced by third parties.37 In this way,
courts have essentially ignored the legislative intent behind section 230,
opting instead for a close textual reading of the statute.38 As of this
writing, Congress has done nothing to correct the courts’ misguided
interpretations.
32. Id.
33. See Lukmire, supra note 22, at 378–80.
34. Lukmire, supra note 22, at 378–80. Specifically, Congress hoped that section 230 would
incentivize internet service providers to censor offensive and indecent material that third parties might
post. Indeed, Representative Christopher Cox stated during a hearing regarding the amendment to the
CDA that would eventually become section 230, “We want to encourage [internet service providers] to
do everything possible for us . . . to help us control, at the portals of our computer, at the front door of
our house, what comes in and what our children see.” 141 CONG. REC. H. 8460 (1995). In addition, the
House Committee Report on the bill further supports this contention. Specifically, the report states
that “[o]ne of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any
other similar decisions which have treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of
content that is not their own because they have restricted access to objectionable material. The
conferees believe that such decisions create serious obstacles to the important federal policy of
empowering parents to determine the content of communications their children receive through
interactive computer services.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996). Thus, legislative history
indicates that Congress envisioned the Good Samaritan safe harbor to serve the narrow purpose of
shielding from liability internet service providers that edit obscene and inappropriate content posted
by users. This purpose is further supported by the statute itself, which invokes language related to
pornography and violence. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2011). Clearly, Congress’s purpose in enacting
the bill is squarely at odds with the courts’ broad interpretation of the statute’s language affording
websites blanket liability for user content.
35. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
36. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
37. See Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1265 (9th Cir. 2016); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
38. Zeran, 129 F. 3d at 330.
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For the foregoing reasons, there is presently no recourse for those
harmed by third-party content on websites. As Hassell demonstrates,
suing individuals who write defamatory statements often leads
nowhere¾such persons are loath to respond to complaints, resulting in
default judgments that, due to the absence of the defendant, preclude the
plaintiff from recovering.39 Furthermore, because internet anonymity
often makes it impossible for plaintiffs to identify those who defame
them in the first place,40 filing a lawsuit can become an impossibility. Due
to section 230, defamed individuals have been precluded from recovering
damages from websites that host defamatory statements.41 However,
now that the California courts have attempted to fashion a remedy for
individuals damaged by defamatory material on the internet,42 it is useful
to examine a line of cases from Zeran v. America Online, Inc., the first
case to render websites immune under section 230, to Hassell. Doing so
reveals the nuances of section 230 and sheds light on the legal
permissibility of the California Court of Appeal’s non-party injunction,
along with its First Amendment implications.
B. SECTION 230 CASE LAW
Section 230 was first interpreted in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.43
In Zeran, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
interpreted the language of section 230 quite broadly, holding that the
statute immunizes internet services providers from liability for
information originating from third parties.44 The facts of Zeran involved
an anonymous individual who posted on AOL message boards that Zeran
was selling distasteful shirts with offensive slogans related to the
Oklahoma City bombing that occurred in 1995.45 The post included
Zeran’s home phone number and invited other AOL users to call him in
order to purchase the shirts.46 Unsurprisingly, this caused Zeran to
receive abusive phone calls and death threats.47 AOL relied on part of
section 23048 as a defense, and the court agreed, stating that “[b]y its
plain language, [section] 230 creates federal immunity to any cause of
39. Hassell v. Bird, 247 Cal. App. 4th 1336, 1343 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
40. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329.
41. Id. at 330.
42. Hassell, 247 Cal. App. 4th at 1341.
43. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 327.
44. Id. at 330.
45. Id. at 329.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2011). That section of the statute reads as follows: “No provider or user
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.”
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action that would make service providers liable for information
originating with a third-party user of the service . . . preclud[ing] courts
from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in
a publisher’s role.”49
Zeran also attempted to argue that even if the court held that AOL
was immune from liability because it was a publisher, it could still be
found liable for the defamatory statements as a distributor with
knowledge of those statements.50 The court rejected this argument on the
grounds that distributor liability is essentially equivalent to publisher
liability. Specifically, the court stated that a distributor is necessarily a
publisher and that, because the language of section 230 makes AOL a
publisher, AOL could not be held liable.51 The court also discussed the
Stratton-Oakmont decision, and Congress’s purpose of enacting section
230 in order to create an incentive to self-regulate.52 The court’s
textualist reading of the statute in Zeran was consistent with the part of
the CDA’s legislative history promoting free communications on the
internet. However, by granting blanket immunity to websites, the court
effectively disincentivized the self-censorship that Congress intended
when it passed section 230 and overturned Stratton-Oakmont. Absent
the potential of liability for what their users write, websites might not
have any reason to expend any resources regulating and censoring user
content.
Other federal courts have followed the Zeran decision. For example,
in 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in
Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc. that the statutory bar against website liability for
user-generated content remained intact and could not be circumvented
merely by way of “creative pleading.”53 That case, like Hassell, involved
allegedly defamatory reviews posted on Yelp.54 Kimzey argued that even
if Yelp was granted immunity under section 230, consistent with the
interpretation in Zeran, the website could still be held liable because it
allegedly had a hand in creating and developing the content.55 Kimzey
further argued that by causing the defamatory review to appear as a
promotion or ad on Google’s search engine, Yelp was also an
“information content provider” as defined under subsection (f)(3) of
section 230¾someone “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 332.
Id. at 331.
Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1265 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1265–66.
Id.
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or development of information.”56 In other words, if Yelp played a role in
the development of the content, it could be held liable for defamation just
as the person who wrote the review could be held liable.57 The court
rejected this argument on the grounds that it was merely artful pleading
designed to circumvent section 230’s safe harbor, and that promoting the
review as an ad on Google did not meet the threshold of creating or
developing content.58
Kimzey illustrates two important points. First, courts continue to
interpret section 230 as providing blanket immunity in the context of
defamation law. Second, Kimzey’s argument about Yelp’s role in
promoting the review presages an argument critical to the validity of the
court’s injunction in Hassell¾that because Bird acted through Yelp to
write her reviews, the court was permitted to enjoin Yelp, despite its
status as a non-party.59
Barrett v. Rosenthal is the most recent case involving a section 230
defense that the California Supreme Court has decided.60 While the
decision is consistent with prior California and federal decisions
regarding section 230, the court, in dicta, also addressed the problem
that the plaintiff in Kimzey raised¾websites that are actively involved in
the creation of user content.61 In a footnote, the court stated that at a
certain point a website’s active involvement in the creation of a
defamatory statement would cause the website to suffer liability.62 The
court did not address what sort of actions a website would have to take in
order to share liability with a user, and acknowledged that “many courts
have reasoned that participation going no further than the traditional
editorial functions of a publisher cannot deprive a defendant of section
230 immunity.”63 Thus, a website would have to do something more than
act merely as a publisher in order to be subject to liability. Pursuant to
Kimzey, actively promoting a defamatory statement on a search engine
would not meet the court’s undetermined threshold.64
Compare these cases to Fair Housing Council of San Fernando
Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, a case in which the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the website defendant did not

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 1266; 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (1996).
Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1267.
Id.
Hassell v. Bird, 247 Cal. App. 4th 1336, 1355–56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006).
Id. at 527 n.19.
Id.
Id.
Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir. 2016).
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enjoy section 230 immunity.65 In Roommates.com, several
governmental housing organizations sued Roommate.com LLC and
alleged that the website’s questionnaires related to users’ gender, race,
sexual orientation, etc., violated the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).66 The
court agreed, holding that Roommate.com LLC developed users’ answers
to the questions by taking the answers and using them to match users
with one another.67 The court provided some guidance as to what,
precisely, “develop” means in the context of section 230, interpreting
“the term ‘development’ as referring not to merely augmenting the
content generally, but to materially contributing to its alleged
unlawfulness.”68
While this guidance is useful in the context of FHA claims, no similar
interpretations of section 230 have been put forth in relation to
defamation claims. If nothing else, Roommates.com shows that courts
are still working through the level of involvement required of a website
to break the immunity that section 230 imposes. Indeed, for FHA claims
that bar appears to be high. Furthermore, given that the case is ten years
old as of this writing, modern advances in computing technology and
search engine algorithms beget the issue of whether, today, a seemingly
lower level of “development” might pass muster with courts as to breach
the broad scope of section 230 immunity.
While it does not appear that Yelp’s role in Hassell rises to the level
of involvement the court mentions in Barrett or Roommates.com, it is
reassuring that the California Supreme Court, albeit only in dicta, has
finally acknowledged that the blanket immunity created by section 230
is problematic.69 The court also appears to be cognizant of the fact that
individuals who are defamed require guidance as to what extent a website
must develop user content in order to lose section 230 immunity and,
thus, provide defamed parties with recourse.70 The remedy applied in
Hassell similarly requires website involvement, but to a much lower
degree than the hypothetical liability thresholds discussed in Barrett or
Roommates.com. Considering the background and history of the remedy
the Court of Appeal ordered in Hassell highlights the benefits and
detriments of the remedy, as well as the First Amendment issues
implicated.

65. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Rommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 (9th
Cir. 2008).
66. Id. at 1162.
67. Id. at 1168.
68. Id. at 1167–68.
69. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 527 n.19 (Cal. 2006).
70. This notion is evident in the mere fact that the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s
injunction in Hassell v. Bird. 247 Cal. App. 4th 1336 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
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C. INJUNCTIONS THAT RUN TO A NON-PARTY
The history of injunctions that run to a non-party goes back over a
century.71 The earliest case in which the United States Supreme Court
issued such an injunction was In re Lennon, where the Court ruled that
an injunction imposed on a railroad company was enforceable against
one of its employees.72 Justice Brown wrote that “[t]o render a person
amenable to an injunction it is neither necessary that he should have
been a party to the suit in which the injunction was issued, nor to have
actually been served with a copy of it, so long as he appears to have had
actual notice.”73 In re Lennon establishes actual notice as a critical
element required for a non-party injunction to be enforceable.74
Importantly, only actual notice, as opposed to formal notice, is
required.75
Two decades after In re Lennon was decided, the California Supreme
Court in Berger v. Superior Court issued a decision that foreshadowed
the link between non-party injunctions and freedom of expression issues
embodied in the First Amendment.76 Berger established a limitation on
how wide non-party injunctions may be cast.77 In Berger, a group of
individuals was enjoined from picketing a theater.78 Upon learning of the
injunction, a new group of picketers began a demonstration of their
own.79 Although the theater attempted to persuade the court that the
injunction applied to the new group of picketers, the court disagreed with
that argument.80 The court affirmed that it is common to have
injunctions “run to classes of person through whom the enjoined party
may act, such as agents, servants, employees, aiders, abettors, etc.,
though not parties to the action.”81 Because the new group of picketers
was in no way related to the original group against which the theater
obtained an injunction, the court held that the injunction could not apply
to the new group of picketers.82
Berger is important for three reasons. First, it illustrates how
delicately courts must consider the relationship of the enjoined parties

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548 (1897).
Id. at 554.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Berger v. Superior Court, 167 P. 143 (Cal. 1917).
Id. at 143.
Id. at 143–44.
Id. at 144.
Id.
Id.
Berger v. Superior Court, 167 P. 143, 144 (Cal. 1917).
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when crafting a non-party injunction.83 Presumably, if the theater proved
that the picketers were two subsets of members of a civic organization, or
merely that the two groups were in communication with one another, the
court may have reached the opposite conclusion. Second, the case
exemplifies the level of scrutiny courts use in cases of non-party
injunctions that relate to free speech and the First Amendment. Finally,
the case sets forth several classes of persons that may be enjoined despite
their non-party status.84 These classes include, most significantly for
purposes of Hassell, individuals “through whom the enjoined party may
act.”85
A more recent case involving non-party injunctions is Ross v.
Superior Court.86 Ross arose in the aftermath of Cooper v. Obledo.87 In
Obledo, the California Supreme Court invalidated several provisions of a
state welfare statute, and issued an injunction requiring the retroactive
payment of benefits.88 One group of county supervisors refused to
comply, arguing that the injunction only ran to the California
Department of Health and Welfare, not the supervisors themselves.89
Despite the fact that the supervisors were not parties to the original
lawsuit, the court held that they were agents of the state agency and, thus,
the injunction applied to them.90 Indeed, the trial court’s injunctive order
was drafted such that it applied to the “defendants, their successors in
office, agents and employees.”91
Ross provides three additional points about non-party remedies.
First, the court clarified the concept of an “agent,” and what types of
individuals constitute agents for the purposes of non-party injunctions.92
Specifically, the court confirmed that an individual or entity through
which the enjoined party may act can be subject to a non-party
injunction.93 Second, Ross established that non-party injunctions may
require the enjoined party to act in a manner that has a retroactive
effect.94 Finally, the court added the element of ability to comply with the
requirements for issuing non-party injunctions.95
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Ross v. Superior Court, 569 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1977).
87. Id. at 729–30; Cooper v. Swoap, 524 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1974). The case was originally titled Cooper
v. Swoap.
88. Ross, 569 P.2d at 730.
89. Id. at 729–31.
90. Id. at 733.
91. Ross, 569 P.2d at 731.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 738.
95. Id.
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Overall, Ross identifies the broad range of classes of persons to
which such an injunction can apply, and undercuts arguments a
petitioner such as Yelp might raise to argue that such an injunction
cannot apply to them. The retroactivity discussion in Ross is significant
because it would not preclude a court from requiring a petitioner to
remove defamatory user content from a website, such as in Hassell. Ross
also reaffirms the requirement of actual notice, as opposed to formal
notice, while adding ability to comply with the elements that must be met
in order to issue non-party injunctions.96
With sufficient background on the CDA and section 230, numerous
courts’ interpretations of section 230, and the remedy that the court
ordered in Hassell, it is necessary to turn to the actual application of said
remedy. In doing so, two interrelated problems become apparent:
whether the court’s imposition of the injunction against Yelp is permitted
under the law, and whether the remedy, in the context of Yelp, violates
the First Amendment.
II. HOW THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT SHOULD
DECIDE HASSELL V. BIRD
The California Supreme Court should partially affirm the lower
court’s ruling by narrowing the scope of the injunction to preclude
removal of future posts by Bird, and giving Yelp a chance to defend in
court against the defamation claim. It is important that Yelp have the
opportunity to do this given the sensitivity of First Amendment issues
that the case raises, and due to Hassell’s receipt of a default judgment. In
order to understand why the court should rule this way, consider first the
consequences should the court reverse the Court of Appeal’s injunction
entirely.
A. THE CONSEQUENCES OF UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT’S DECISION
Currently, most individuals who are the subject of defamatory
statements posted on review websites, or anywhere on the internet for
that matter, have essentially no recourse. A primary reason for this is
internet anonymity. For example, in Zeran the plaintiff was forced to
endure death threats, have his home placed under protective
surveillance, and nearly shut down his business.97 Due to section 230
immunity, Zeran did not recover any damages whatsoever.98 One might
suggest that Zeran should have sued the person who wrote that he was
selling t-shirts making light of the Oklahoma City bombings, but doing
96. Id. at 731–32.
97. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1997).
98. Id. at 330.
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so would have been impossible. Internet message boards, such as the one
on which someone defamed the plaintiff in Zeran,99 along with review
websites, comments on news articles, and a multitude of other internet
service providers all permit users¾that is, content providers, which
include individuals who post on the internet¾to remain anonymous.
Theoretically, it might be possible for a website to use an Internet
Protocol address (“IP address”) to cooperate with lawsuits and track
down names and addresses of third-party content providers.100 This kind
of cooperation, however, might burden websites. Indeed, the burden is
likely higher than that brought on by the remedy ordered in Hassell, as
websites would have to expend far more time and resources tracking
down users via their IP addresses than they would by simply removing
defamatory content.
Identifying users is only the first in a long line of hurdles plaintiffs
would have to jump to sue their defamers. Once identified, plaintiffs
must serve defendants in order to recover. Service of process itself could
be especially challenging, given the fact that identifying a plaintiff by way
of his or her IP address would not necessarily yield a physical address at
which to serve them.101
In addition, getting the defendants to answer the complaint would
be another challenge entirely. As Hassell illustrates, some defendants
simply will not respond to the complaint.102 There are a number of
reasons that a defendant might ignore the complaint. For example,
perhaps a hacker used a random IP address to post defamatory
statements online. Alternatively, perhaps an identified defendant does
not care enough to respond to the complaint and would be perfectly
happy if a court ordered the website to remove the language. For reasons
unknown, Bird ignored Hassell’s complaint, resulting in a default
judgment.103 The challenge of identifying the defamer, combined with
the challenge of hauling him or her into court, are two prime reasons why
the solution of simply suing the individual behind defamatory writings is
simply impractical.
A broader policy implication of not allowing recourse for victims of
defamation becomes evident by way of analogy to other types of claims
in which websites are deemed liable for their actions. In one such
situation, websites¾in reality, the operators of such websites¾have
99. Id. at 329.
100. See Louise Story, How Do They Track You? Let Us Count the Ways, N.Y. TIMES: BITS
(Mar. 9, 2008, 11:19 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/how-do-they-track-you-letus-count-the-ways/.
101. Id.
102. Hassell v. Bird, 247 Cal. App. 4th 1336, 1343 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
103. Id.
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been held liable for acting as a conduit for criminal activity.104 Perhaps
the most infamous example is Silk Road, an online marketplace via the
darknet where users could purchase illicit drugs, among other
contraband.105 For several years, and with little success, law enforcement
worked to prosecute individuals who purchased or sold drugs on Silk
Road.106 The marketplace was finally shut down, at least temporarily
until other parties created successor marketplaces such as Silk Road 2.0
and Silk Road 3.0.107
The story of Silk Road might be viewed as a microcosm of the larger
issue of internet defamation. While prosecutors were unable to solve the
problem of Silk Road by prosecuting its users, they prosecuted the person
who ran Silk Road and succeeded in shutting down the marketplace.108
Similarly, internet defamation cannot be addressed by targeting
individual users, as explored at length above and exhibited perfectly by
the problems presented by Hassell. If Congress refuses to update the
language of section 230 to better reflect the innovative nature of the
internet, along with their original goal of encouraging websites to
self-censor, and if courts continue to interpret the poorly-written statute
as granting blanket immunity to websites, the problem of internet
defamation will never be solved. Thus, unless courts and Congress are
determined to leave defamation victims with no recourse, a creative
remedy involving the websites themselves, such as that of non-party
injunctions, demands implementation.
B. THE CONSEQUENCES OF IMPLEMENTING THIS SOLUTION
Due to the significant consequences of maintaining the status quo
regarding section 230’s grant of total immunity, it is necessary to
consider the problems that might arise should the California Supreme
Court decide to partially affirm the Court of Appeal’s injunction by
disallowing removal of future posts by Bird, and giving Yelp a chance to
defend against the defamation claim. This remedy begs the question: can
a court issue a non-party injunction ordering a website to remove
arguably protected speech?

104. Benjamin Weiser, Ross Ulbricht, Creator of Silk Road Website, Is Sentenced to Life in Prison,
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/nyregion/ross-ulbricht-creator
-of-silk-road-website-is-sentenced-to-life-in-prison.html.
105. Adrian Chen, The Underground Website Where You Can Buy Any Drug Imaginable, GAWKER
(June 1, 2011, 1:14 PM), http://gawker.com/5805928/the-underground-website-where-you-can-buyany-drug-imaginable [http://web.archive.org/web/20110603015735/].
106. Id.
107. Joseph Bradley, Silk Road 3.0 Is Back . . . Will It Last?, CRYPTOCOINS NEWS (May 14, 2016,
2:01 AM), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/silk-road-3-0-back-will-last/.
108. Supra note 104.

K - MARANO_13 (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

1326

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

5/26/18 12:54 PM

[Vol. 69:1311

1. The Presumption Against Injunctions in Defamation Cases
As a threshold issue, it is important to consider the long-standing
rule that equitable remedies, such as injunctions, are not permitted in
defamation cases because, functionally, they violate the Prior Restraint
Doctrine.109 Professor Chemerinksy, a constitutional law scholar, has
argued against the recent trend involving some courts that have departed
from the aforementioned rule.110 Although the United States Supreme
Court has never decided the question of whether injunctions are
permissible in defamation cases,111 the California Supreme Court, in
Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen held that “following a trial at
which it is determined that the defendant defamed the plaintiff, the court
may issue an injunction prohibiting the defendant from repeating . . .
statements determined to be defamatory.”112 In addition, the court noted
that such injunctions must be drawn in an extremely narrow manner as
to avoid violating the Prior Restraint Doctrine.113 Nevertheless, in his
article, Professor Chemerinsky argues that crafting narrow injunctions
prohibiting defamatory speech would ultimately be useless and serve no
functional purpose.114 On the other hand, a broader injunction that
covers future speech would be an unconstitutional prior restraint.115
While these are valid arguments for purposes of traditional
defamation law, in cases of internet defamation, an individual’s
defamatory speech can remain accessible for many years. People often
consult Yelp when deciding to eat at a certain restaurant, use a particular
business, or, as in Hassell, choose a personal injury lawyer. Indeed, in
Hassell, the Court of Appeal’s injunction only applied to the existing
reviews that Bird posted on Yelp.116 As mentioned above, the Court of
Appeal remanded the case so that the trial court could reframe the
injunction and eliminate the portion that requires Yelp to delete future
reviews of Hassell’s law firm posted by the same user that posted the
initial defamatory review¾Birdzeye B.117
109. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Injunctions in Defamation Cases, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV .
157 (2007) (discussing, in general, the rule against injunctions in defamation cases, and why courts
should continue following that rule). The Prior Restraint Doctrine holds unconstitutional court orders
that censor speech before it takes place. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (The “Pentagon
Papers” Case), 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
110. Chemerinsky, supra note 109, at 157–58.
111. See Tory et al. v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 738–39 (2005) (due to the plaintiff’s death, the Court
decided the case on narrow grounds and did not resolve the broad question of whether injunctions are
allowed in defamation cases).
112. 156 P.3d 339, 349 (Cal. 2007).
113. Id. at 351–52.
114. Chemerinsky, supra note 109, at 171.
115. Chemerinsky, supra note 109, at 171.
116. Hassell v. Bird, 247 Cal. App. 4th 1336, 1341 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
117. Id. at 1345.
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An injunction requiring the removal of existing defamatory
language posted to a website would be neither a prior restraint, nor futile.
Although an individual who defames another on a website could,
theoretically, repeat the same statement in slightly different language,
that argument should not preclude injunctions for internet defamation
causes of action. This is especially true in a case where the plaintiff
receives a default judgment, such as in Hassell. In such cases, the
defendant’s disinterest in litigating the claim suggests that defendants
will be unlikely do anything in response to a website that removes their
speech. Thus, it is unlikely that a narrow injunction covering only
existing defamatory language would be ineffective and cause a defendant
to defame again.
2. The First Amendment and Enjoining Non-Parties
Issues related to freedom of expression and the First Amendment
are the most likely challenges that arise in the context of non-party
injunctions that enjoin speech. Indeed, the American Civil Liberties
Union (“ACLU”) filed an amicus letter with the California Supreme Court
on this matter and asked the court to drop the Court of Appeal’s
injunction altogether.118 The ACLU argues that a court may not issue an
injunction to a non-party, even where the non-party has a close
relationship with the defendant and where the injunction only prohibits
actions that have been found to be illegal.119 Moreover, the ACLU believes
that the specific injunction the Court of Appeal issued is not permissible
given that it requires Yelp to remove arguably protected speech.120
However, the cases that the ACLU presents do not support these
arguments, and while the ACLU is correct that the Court of Appeal’s
injunction is overbroad, the injunction should not be struck down.
Instead, it should be narrowed to prevent removal of future Bird posts
and also to provide Yelp and Hassell with the opportunity to argue the
case on the merits and determine whether Bird’s review is actually
protected speech.
The ACLU relies on the case Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc. to assert that the court’s injunction is not permitted.121
Specifically, the ACLU argues that Zenith Radio supports the notion that
due process prohibits such an injunction because Yelp did not participate

118. Amicus Letter, Hassell v. Bird, 247 Cal. App. 4th (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (No. A143233)
(supporting request for review), https://www.aclunc.org/docs/20160815-hassell_amicus_letter.pdf
(“ACLU Letter”).
119. Id. at 1.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1 (citing Zenith Radio v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969)).
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in the lawsuit and was not an agent of Bird.122 However, this case is
centered on issues of jurisdiction, not non-party liability. In Zenith
Radio¾a patent infringement case¾the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed an injunction against the defendant
corporation, but set aside an identical injunction against a corporate
subsidiary of the defendant.123 The United States Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the injunction was
properly set aside due to a lack of personal jurisdiction.124 The Court
wrote that “a court has no power to adjudicate a personal claim or
obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.”125
The ACLU’s amicus letter overlooks the specificity of the findings in
Zenith Radio, namely, that the injunction was invalidated for
jurisdictional reasons.126 It was not invalidated solely for non-party
reasons. Indeed, there is ample authority permitting courts to enjoin
parties through which a defendant might act, as set forth at length in Part
II.
Perhaps in light of its selective reading of Zenith Radio, the ACLU
seemingly clarifies its argument related to injunctions running to
non-parties by noting that such orders are not permitted when they
prohibit someone’s exercise of free speech.127 This idea is supported in
Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, discussed below, and
it merits consideration given that free speech is a constitutionally
protected right that demands the utmost respect.128 Despite the rule
against injunctions in defamation cases, the critical failure of this
argument is that the Yelp review, regardless of whether it is defamatory,
is not Yelp’s speech. The ACLU acknowledges that as a distributor, Yelp
has an interest in protecting the speech, like a newspaper.129 However,
section 230 shields Yelp from liability as an internet service provider,
unlike in traditional defamation law where publishers are treated as
speakers. Thus, the ACLU’s argument by analogy is incomplete and
without merit. No authority supports the idea that a non-party injunction
regarding internet speech should be under all circumstances barred. The
court has enjoined Yelp as a publisher, not an original speaker. Although
the injunction crafted by the Court of Appeal remains problematic,

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Amicus Letter, supra note 118, at 4.
Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at 107.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 110 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878)).
Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at 110.
Amicus Letter, supra note 118, at 2.
Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
Amicus Letter, supra note 118, at 2.
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non-party injunctions in defamation cases should not be wholly barred
because a remedy at law may be unattainable.
Indeed, if the review were to be considered Yelp’s speech, then Yelp
would not be protected under section 230.130 Section 230 only protects
websites and internet providers when someone else’s speech appears on
them.131 For example, if Yelp, as a website, hired professional reviewers
to critique restaurants,132 Yelp would not be protected if a court found
language in such a review to be defamatory. The statute immunizes
websites from publication and repetition liability¾protections not
afforded to newspapers and magazines under traditional defamation law.
Of course, if traditional defamation law applied to internet speech, the
argument would have merit. However, barring an injunction because it
would infringe on Yelp’s right to free speech contradicts the way that
courts have interpreted section 230. As an internet service provider, Yelp
enjoys section 230’s safe harbor. Therefore, the argument that Yelp’s
“speech” cannot be enjoined fails because Yelp is not treated as the
speaker under section 230. Thus, the injunction, in some form, must be
permitted.
Nevertheless, according to Carroll, such orders are prohibited when
the non-party has not received notice and has had no chance to
participate in the court proceedings.133 Yelp received notice of the
injunction, is participating in the case, and satisfies the other
requirement of a non-party injunction, which is the ability to comply.
Whether Yelp’s level of involvement meets the participation requirement
set forth in Carroll is unclear. However, in case it does not, the solution
is simple: the court should give Yelp the chance to defend the defamation
claim. Indeed, because Hassell received a default judgment, the ACLU
reluctantly suggests that Yelp should at least have the opportunity to
defend Bird’s speech.134
Providing Yelp with the opportunity to defend the defamation claim
would eliminate possible constitutional law issues related to Bird’s
reviews because defamatory speech is generally not protected by the First
Amendment. Procedurally, litigating the defamation claim could also
relieve the burden on Yelp of having to remove third-party content. When
considering public policy, litigating the defamation claim appears to help
both victims of defamation, who would have the opportunity to force
defamatory statements to be retracted, and websites, which would have
to institute standards that their users must rise to. This, in effect,
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2011).
Id.
The Zagat Guide is a publication that reviews and rates restaurants.
Carroll, 393 U.S. at 180.
Amicus Letter, supra note 118, at 6.
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supports the very purpose of the CDA itself¾it facilitates self-censorship
of websites, and still grants the immunity that courts have interpreted
section 230 to provide.
The ACLU’s amicus letter and the Carroll opinion both support the
idea that non-party injunctions involving arguably protected speech
should be crafted narrowly as to avoid disruption of constitutional
rights.135 If the California Supreme Court narrows the Court of Appeal’s
injunction to only include the current Yelp reviews, and not future Yelp
reviews from Bird, the injunction would satisfy the narrow standard
permitted for such injunctions. If the California Supreme Court also
remands the case for a new trial on the merits of the defamation claim,
then Yelp would have the opportunity to defend the speech in order to
determine whether it would need to comply with the narrower
injunction. Yelp could try the case, or simply delete the reviews and avoid
the time and expense associated with the former choice. Regardless of
what Yelp does, this remedy would have the benefits of satisfying the
plaintiff’s claim and protecting freedom of expression under the First
Amendment.
However, as a practical matter, giving Yelp and other websites a
chance to defend arguably defamatory language presents a glaring
problem. Because Yelp only serves as publisher, it would be quite difficult
to make factual findings with any certainty as to the speech itself. Yelp is
not prepared to play the role of reporter and investigate the truthfulness
of reviews posted by users. A defamation claim requires a false
defamatory assertion of fact concerning the plaintiff.136 This first element
of defamation can be difficult to prove due to the falsity requirement; it
often requires courts to have parties testify under oath to determine the
veracity of an alleged defamatory statement.137 As a result, Yelp would be
left with quite a challenge should it, on remand, have to defend Bird’s
review. Indeed, certain statements could be easy to verify. For example,
that “the [H]assell [L]aw [G]roup didn’t [sic] ever speak to [the insurance
company]”138 is an easily verified fact. Other statements, such as
“[Hassell] dropped the case because of her mother,”139 are impossible to
prove absent some sort of email chain or other form of evidence between
Hassell and Bird. Even with evidentiary support, the truth of the evidence
might be unclear. A quick glance at Bird’s review and Hassell’s response
135. Amicus Letter, supra note 118, at 5; Carroll, 393 U.S. at 183.
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 1976).
137. Callum Borchers, The New York Times Just Dared Donald Trump to Sue, WASH. POST: THE
FIX (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/10/13/donald-trump
(quoting John Diamond).
138. Birdzeye B., supra note 12.Error! Bookmark not defined.
139. Birdzeye B., supra note 12.

K - MARANO_13 (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

May 2018]

5/26/18 12:54 PM

CAUGHT IN THE WEB

1331

to it illustrates this problem perfectly: both contain contradictory
statements.140 While it would be challenging enough for a finder of fact
to determine whether Bird’s statements were false if Bird were to come
to court and litigate the claim herself, it would be an entirely different
challenge should Yelp be subjected to that task.
The First Amendment is of principal concern in the context of
enjoining a non-party for an action related to allegedly defamatory
speech. Nevertheless, if the speech is judged to be defamatory, First
Amendment rights can still be protected in the context of internet speech.
In an action where speech has been adjudged defamatory, courts should
be permitted to enjoin the internet service providers on which the speech
appears and have them remove the unprotected speech¾unless of course
the individual who wrote the language is tried and removes it him or
herself. In situations such as Hassell, where a default judgment was
issued, courts should allow the same remedy. That said, the remedy
should be stipulated to include a trial on the merits in which the website
is permitted to defend the speech, should the website choose to expend
the time and effort in doing so.
CONCLUSION
Due to a lack of foresight, and perhaps with unbridled optimism,
members of Congress drafted section 230 of the CDA in a way that today
is highly ineffective. Rather than encourage the internet self-regulation
and censorship that Congress hoped section 230 would foster, section
230 has done little more than provide websites and internet service
providers with blanket immunity against any claims arising out of
content posted by third-party users. This safe harbor permits third
parties, whether maliciously or unintentionally, to defame innocent
individuals online, all the while requiring no responsibility or care from
the websites on which they post. The unintended consequences of section
230 have greatly harmed victims of online defamation, while allowing the
often-anonymous perpetrators, along with the websites publishing the
defamatory statements, to enjoy no liability whatsoever.
Currently faced with Hassell, the California Supreme Court is in the
unique position of devising an appropriate remedy that will allow victims
of online defamation to mitigate their damages through injunctions. By
permitting courts to issue non-party injunctions that would require
websites and internet service providers to remove defamatory
statements, individuals who are defamed online will finally begin to
obtain justice against those who have defamed them. While such

140. Birdzeye B., supra note 12.
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injunctions naturally implicate the First Amendment, these injunctions
can be crafted narrowly so as to ensure that websites are only required to
remove speech that a court has determined to be defamatory. Such
narrow injunctions should satisfy attacks from critics who argue that
injunctions in defamation cases function as prior restraints.141 Although
these critics also point out that very narrow injunctions are functionally
useless, arguments exists that show otherwise.142 Ultimately, only when
a court issues a narrow injunction requiring a website to remove
defamatory language will it become known with any certainty whether
the injunction indeed served its purpose.
While some argue that the burden of this remedy is cost prohibitive
on the websites due to the time and resources they would have to expend
deleting content, these costs are a very small price to pay compared with
the dangers associated with the boundless immunity from liability that
section 230 grants. The California Supreme Court should modify the
Court of Appeal’s injunction against Yelp in a way to have it cover only
speech that currently appears on Yelp, while also giving Yelp the
opportunity to defend the speech should it choose to do so. Should the
Court pursue this path, it will pave the way for section 230 to function
more effectively in the modern internet era, and also encourage the sort
of self-regulation that Congress originally envisioned when enacting the
law.

141. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 109; Jim Stewart & Len Niehoff, Zombies Among Us:
Injunctions in Defamation Cases Come Back from the Dead, 30 COMM. Law 28 (2014).
142. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 109; Jim Stewart & Len Niehoff, Zombies Among Us:
Injunctions in Defamation Cases Come Back from the Dead, 30 COMM. Law 28 (2014).

